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Abstract 
The attraction of blue-chip listings in emerging stock markets is a major policy initiative 
common across much of the developing world.  In many cases however, local blue-chip firms are 
the result of foreign Multinational Enterprise (MNE) firms engaging with local indigenous 
partners to form an international joint venture (IJV).  These are unique with bilateral governance 
structures underscoring co-ownership between partners of residual cash flows and assets of the 
IJV.  Using a unique and comprehensive sample of 202 IPO firms from across the emerging 
African region evidence of both a pronounced internal as well as external role for IJV boards 
was found.  While the internal role underscores significantly smaller board sizes with these being 
populated by higher proportions of foreign directors from parent and related investors, the 
external role involves markedly higher proportions of nonexecutives from military and university 
social elite backgrounds.  Finally evidence that IJV firms are more likely under conditions of 
weaker state-level corruption control was found. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a sizeable literature regarding international joint ventures (IJVs) in terms of their stability 
and performance (Brouthers, 2013; Reuer and Koza, 2000), as well as the motivations behind their 
use in foreign direct investment (FDI) (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Dunning, 2001) as opposed to 
comparable mechanisms such as greenfield sites or takeovers and the formation of wholly owned 
subsidiaries (Kogut and Singh, 1998; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009).  Despite the 
common assumption of IJV boards an essential mechanism in the alleviation of ex-post moral 
hazard between incumbent partners (Williamson, 1991), very little research has focussed on the 
distinctive board governance characteristics of these hybrid organizational forms.  Two prominent 
exceptions are studies by Kumar and Seth (1998) and Reuer, Klijn and Lioukas (2013).  Kumar 
and Seth undertook an explorative study of the board-level coordination and control mechanisms 
for the management of IJV-parent relationships developing a theoretical framework based on 
structural contingency, resource dependency and agency.  In contrast Reuer et al focused on the 
tension faced by IJV boards in attaining administrative control so as to monitor and coordinate 
venture’s activities on behalf of parent partners against the value of delegating authority to local 
management.  An apparent shortfall in the literature arising through this prior internal focus on 
IJV board role is a lack of study towards the external co-optation mechanisms (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) employed by IJV boards to alleviate environmental uncertainty arising from 
institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).  Our study focuses on 
this shortfall in terms of the composition of IJV boards through nonexecutive directors recruited 
from social elites that are prominent in indigenous political economy.  This forms our first 
contribution to literature. 
 We focus our study on the distinctive sample of IJVs that are motivated to list through 
initial primary offering (IPO) on the national stock markets associated with indigenous host 
partners.  This reflects the growing importance of IJV entities in the attraction of listings from 
fledgling formal economies of many emerging economies (Lavelle, 2001; Bennell, 1997; Hearn 
 4 
and Piesse, 2013; Hearn, 2014).  This addresses a shortfall in the literature which has been almost 
exclusively focussed on the capital raising, valuation and performance implications on the stock of 
parent partners in major international stock markets, such as US and UK, arising from the decision 
to initiate an IJV.  The listing of the IJV entity itself in emerging indigenous stock markets, 
together with the political legitimacy, enhancement of brand awareness and indigenization of 
ownership motivations for this (Saudagaran, 1988; Lavelle, 2001), have been largely overlooked.  
This is despite the importance of IJV listing as a common part of partial, or phased, privatization 
processes in many emerging economies (Lavelle, 2001; Bennell, 1997) where moribund former 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) have been subject to phased divestment to foreign partners (Perotti, 
1995).  Our exclusive study of IPOs is their ability to yield an exclusive insight into the 
governance structure of IJV entities where listing is attributed to legitimacy concerns (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) than a pivotal event on the entrepreneurial life cycle of the firm as envisaged by 
Brav and Gompers (2003).  Consideration of IPOs also facilitates study of governance given the 
ubiquitous availability of detailed firm-level data from prospectus filings which is at best only 
sporadically available from a wider sample of all listed firms (Munisi et al, 2014).  The uniqueness 
of our focus on IJV IPOs forms our second contribution to literature. 
 Africa provides a unique context for our study given an almost complete lack of literature 
regarding MNE activity, FDI and IJV formation on the continent.  This is despite some evidence 
of the importance and prevalence of IJVs in West Africa (Boateng and Glaister, 2002) and a very 
recent study by Bartels et al (2014) focussing on the distinctive location-based factors influencing 
FDI across the continent.  There is a sharp distinction in institutional environment between civil 
code law countries (mostly former French and Portuguese colonies) and their common law 
counterparts (former UK colonies) (La Porta et al, 2008).  Furthermore there is significant 
variation in institutional quality across the continent, ranging from that of Botswana, considered 
on a par with Western Europe, to Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria, on a par with least developed 
worldwide (Transparency International, 2013).  Africa provides a unique and ideal laboratory 
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within which to study a theoretical tension in IJV boards between their internally-focussed role on 
performance monitoring and evaluation of venture with their complimentary external role in 
securing political legitimacy, access to resources and information.  It also justifies our 
consideration of institutional theory over and above structural contingency and resource 
dependency perspectives that have been successfully applied by Kumar and Seth (1998).  These 
notably lack the deeper contextualization which institutional theory provides while also providing 
an opportunity to institutionally-mediate theoretically anticipated relationships regarding the 
environmental co-optation and boundary-spanning role of boards (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) with respect to changes in institutional environment and quality.  This 
forms our third contribution to literature. 
 While there is a considerable literature regarding the boundary-spanning role of 
nonexecutive board members in facilitating environmental co-optation for firms which is largely 
theoretically rooted in resource dependency perspective (see Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009 
for a full review), on the extension of this focuses on the recruitment of governmental (Hillman 
and Keim, 1995; Lester et al, 2008; Holburn and van den Bergh, 2008) and politically-linked 
directors (Hillman, 2005; Hillman et al, 1999; 2004).  All of this literature has focussed on the 
developed markets of US and UK with the recruitment of nonexecutives being focussed on those 
with governmental or political backgrounds.  North (1990) argues that the structure of emerging 
political economies are often very different from their developed country counterparts.  Polity’s 
are typically much narrower and controlled by handfuls of social elites with considerable vested 
private benefits of control.  In this light we extend the traditional literature focus on governmental 
and politically-linked elites through consideration of four categories of social elite prevalent in 
African IPO firms from identification of these backgrounds in listings prospectuses.  These are 
military, governmental, commercial and university.  This forms our fourth and final contribution 
to literature. 
 6 
 We construct and employ a comprehensive database of 202 IPOs undertaken across Africa 
between January 2000 and January 2014 and find evidence that increasing proportions of boards 
drawn from indigenous social elites are positively associated with IJVs compared to their public 
company counterparts.  This relationship was negatively moderated in civil code law 
environments in contrast to their common law counterparts.  Equally this relationship was 
positively moderated in high institutional quality environments compared to their low institutional 
quality counterparts.  Increased governmental and commercial elites are prevalent on IJV boards.  
The former are associated with country-level improvements in corruption control and political 
stability while the latter are only marginally associated with improvements in political stability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and democratic voice and accountability measures. 
 The paper proceeds as follows: the next section outlines the theoretical background and 
hypothesis formation.  Section 3 outlines data sources alongside dependent and independent 
variable definitions and empirical methods.  Section 4 outlines the results within the context of 
previous related research and the final section concludes with implications for management and 
limitations. 
 
2.  Theory and hypotheses 
The structure and operational duties of IJV boards share a number of similarities with their public 
company counterparts (Reuer et al, 2013).  This is evidenced by a mutual emphasis of board’s 
having a fiduciary duty in terms of the performance monitoring and oversight (surveillance) of 
senior management within the venture (Hambrick, Li, Xin and Tsui, 2001; Yan and Gray, 1994).  
These duties are supplemented with an emphasis of directors providing advice and counsel to 
management (Adams et al, 2010; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) as 
well as in coordinating partner and venture actions through effecting strategic plans and 
reconciling the different needs of partners within the venture’s core operations (Kumar and Seth, 
1998; Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006).  Given the TCE emphasis on the bounded rationality (cognitive 
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limitations) of partners to a joint venture and that their interaction is fraught with potential 
opportunism owing to inherently incomplete contract structure, the IJV board has an important 
function in monitoring the collaborations performance, engaging in ad-hoc private ordering by 
addressing conflicts as and when these arise, and adapting the actions of the venture (see Geringer 
and Hebert, 1989; Kumar and Seth, 1998; Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006).  The control and 
coordination of the joint venture on behalf of the parents entails both the appraisal of the venture’s 
performance and managerial decision-making, as well as guarding the venture from detrimental 
(sub-optimal) actions by its members (see Kriger, 1988; Adams and Fereira, 2007).  Board 
composition in IJVs in terms of director representation of partners tends to be reflective of the 
respective partner equity stakes in the venture (Hewitt, 2005).  Significant departures may take 
place from this premise.  In particular, there are a variety of other mechanisms available to 
partners to exert control over the IJV with these including the staffing of key managerial positions 
with parent executives (Killing, 1983; Kumar and Seth, 1998) and the design of incentive 
packages (Killing, 1983).  This is alongside a host of socialization of IJV management with those 
of the parent (Kumar and Seth, 1998) and integrative mechanisms such as direct contact between 
parent executives and IJV personnel (Killing, 1983).  These represent various mechanisms by 
which parents exert control over the IJV beyond their strict entitlement through voting rights 
attributed to their proportionate equity stake in venture. 
 
Environmental co-optation of IJV boards through social elite board members 
IJVs and their boards sit at a juncture between two opposing forces:  the need for accentuated 
control by parent and the capacity to act independently with minimal interference in order to be 
reactive to environmental uncertainty (Kumar and Seth, 1998).  Following Kumar and Seth, we 
develop arguments framed on structural contingency and resource dependency as well as 
institutional theory in focussing on the composition of IJV boards with directors recruited from 
indigenous social elites.  Their role is in enabling the IJV board to internalize externalities related 
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to environmental uncertainty and thereby turn an otherwise costly environmental deficiency into a 
firm-specific competitive advantage (Lester et al, 2008; Peng, 2004). 
 Structural contingency theory views organizations as complex “information-processing 
networks” (Galbraith, 1973: 6).  A key objective is in achieving an efficient match between the 
information processing requirements of strategic contingencies and the information-processing 
capabilities of organizational coordination and control mechanisms (Galbraith, 1973, 1977; 
Tushman and Nadler, 1978).  This theoretical lens views the JV as an integral part of the parents 
information-processing network.  Kumar and Seth (1998) argue that as strategic interdependence 
between JV and parent grows then so does the need for information-processing requirements of 
the JV.  This in turn infers the JV board’s information-processing capacity must be increased with 
enhanced integrative mechanisms with parent, director interlock, and socialization of JV board 
with parent.  The contingency lens eschews flexibility in terms of accommodating an opposing 
view of governance with respect to the JV encountering greater environmental uncertainty derived 
through institutional deficiencies.  In particular, the information-processing requirements of the JV 
face increasing demands arising from the complexity and richness of information obtained from 
local immediate environment surrounding JV.  Information-processing capabilities of the JV 
necessarily need to respond through greater autonomy in its relationship with parent through 
looser linkages, a lessening of parental control, and enhanced managerial discretion of boards and 
executives in order to process information and respond in a timely manner (Lewis, 1990).  
Applications of contingency theory have argued that overseas subsidiaries of MNEs are a source 
of potential value in terms of their active pursuit of localized networks in terms of information and 
resources as well as the network itself.  The resources and information acquired through the 
network are considered inimitable and non-substitutable leading to the embeddedness of the 
subsidiary within its local context as a valuable source of sustainable competitive advantage 
(Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000).  Structural contingency theory views the effects arising from 
strategic interdependence and environmental uncertainty as opposing forces.  However the 
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structural contingency perspective does eschew the view that corporate ties to social elites are 
critical to facilitate information processing capacity of IJV and its ability to mitigate generic 
environmental uncertainty. 
 The resource dependency perspective adopts an exclusive focus on the boundary-spanning 
role of directors in terms of their ability to secure both resources and information from immediate 
environment surrounding firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Strategic interdependence between 
IJV and parent is viewed to generate an enhanced need for IJV directors with extensive knowledge 
and social networks within the parent in order to act as an effective conduit for obtaining resources 
from parent to achieve the economic survival of IJV entity.  The central boundary-spanning role of 
the board in securing the economic survival of the firm, or IJV in this case, is prominent under 
conditions of environmental uncertainty.  Under environmental uncertainty, the resource 
dependency perspective allows a shift in emphasis to the externally-facing role of IJV directors on 
attempting to alleviate environmental turbulence and achieving a degree of stability and 
predictability surrounding the IJV (Pffefer and Salancik, 1978).  Melkumov (2009) cites one 
mechanism of achieving environmental co-adaptation is through director interlocks with other 
organizations, political and governmental authorities.  Judge and Naoumova (2004) and McCarthy 
and Puffer (2002) both find evidence of increasing proportions of government elites on boards of 
Russian and Chinese firms, where these countries institutional environments have historically 
been dominated by extensive state involvement. 
 The third and final theoretical perspective is that of institutional theory.  There is a 
considerable literature regarding the new institutional economics literature of North (1990, 1991) 
and the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions in shaping societal incentives and 
impacting on economic production.  A combination of sociological institutional theory (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) and Scott’s (1995) three-dimensioned definition of institutional environments 
have been very recently employed to rationalize the use of IJVs in FDI by MNE firms. 
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The sociological-based perspective of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outlines three key 
institutional pressures influencing socially embedded firms towards attaining legitimacy over 
operational efficiency considerations.  These are coercive, defined in terms of formal government 
regulations and laws, normative, defined as cultural and societal expectations, and mimetic, 
defined as the need to copy other organizations within an industry or economic sector in order to 
alleviate environmental uncertainties.  The social and political legitimacy gained from 
organizations adaptation to isomorphic conformity trump concerns over operational efficiency and 
profitability (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Firms that lack this legitimacy are disadvantaged in 
accessing resources, such as top managerial support, state funding and the support of a cohesive 
customer-base (Dacin et al, 2007; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  Scott (1995) developed a three 
dimensioned rationalization of institutional environment centred on the notion of three “pillars” 
that provide “related but distinguishable bases of legitimacy” (Scott, 1995: 47).  These are the 
normative, namely values and norms, the cognitive, namely shared conceptions of reality and 
frames through which meaning is inferred, and the regulatory, defined as rule-setting, monitoring 
and sanctioning activities.  These three pillars provide an essential framework with which to 
interpret the institutional setting within a country.  Firms, and in this case IJVs, respond to 
institutional pressures by making strategic choices to either comply, co-opt or defy the 
institutional framework. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) develop arguments regarding intra-industry mimetic 
pressures leading to “band-wagon” behaviour where a common mode of entry into new markets is 
emulated by all related economic, or industry, participants.  A degree of commonality is adopted 
in IJV formation being the entry mode “of choice” rather than economic necessity.  This alone 
would support the enhanced internal role of the IJV board.  It should also be noted however that 
the institutional perspective recognizes severely underdeveloped regulatory pillar across much of 
Africa with a prevalence for the cognitive pillar in many countries making up for this regulatory 
institutional shortfall.  Given the importance of the cognitive institutional pillar, institutional 
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theory explicitly justifies the external linkages of the IJV board in order to conform to local 
indigenous institutional pressures in order to achieve social legitimacy.  We argue that this 
emphasis on external role of IJV board infers environmental co-optation through the recruitment 
of nonexecutives drawn from indigenous social elites. 
A further application of this institutional perspective is advanced by Owens, Palmer and 
Zueva-Owens (2013) and also focuses on legitimacy issues influencing the decision for IJV 
formation.  This builds on the three-dimensioned institutional framework of Scott (1995) where 
Yiu and Makino (2002) propose two methods firms can attain cognitive legitimacy: external and 
internal mimetic isomorphism.  The former involves mimicry of successful firms in the same 
industrial sector through adopting similar structures, procedures and practices (Huang and 
Sternquist, 2007).  In contrast, the latter adopts an inward focus within the firm where 
conformation to internal routines and habitual behaviour derived from past successful experiences 
is key to achieving legitimacy (Lu, 2002, Huang and Sternquist, 2007).  The normative pillar 
details commonly accepted informal societal and cultural prescriptions governing ethically 
acceptable behaviour with these being encapsulated in norms, values, beliefs and goals (Hillman 
and Wan, 2005; Ruef and Scott, 1998) with these being highly tacit in nature.  The regulatory 
pillar refers to the most explicit prescriptions with these taking the form of formal legal and 
regulatory statutes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).  Firms establish legitimacy by 
operating in accordance with relevant legal and quasi-legal requirements (Scott, 1995) with failure 
to acquire regulatory legitimacy preventing its ability to operate legally and access resources 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  Thus an explicit assumption of the institutional perspective is 
organizational attenuation of social legitimacy this motivating a prominent role of social elites in 
achieving this goal. 




Hypothesis 1:  IJV IPO firm boards are positively associated with increasing proportions of 
nonexecutives drawn from social elite backgrounds 
 
It should be noted that the aggregate social elites measure includes elites drawn from four very 
different backgrounds: namely military, governmental, commercial and academic (university).  
The social elites measure includes four different dimensions facilitating the study of specific social 
elite backgrounds, drawn from within the indigenous political economy, in their representation on 
IJV boards. 
 
The impact of legal origin on social elite board composition in IJVs 
While countries across Africa are unique in exhibiting a sharp distinction between their adhering 
to either civil code or common law systems (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schliefer and Vishny, 
2008), this distinction based on legal system alone is at best tenuous owing to their often severely 
underdeveloped nature (Joireman, 2001; Bennell, 1997).  Instead the contrast is better made 
through consideration of the deeper and more pervasive economic, regulatory, political 
governance structures that each engenders.  In particular former French colonies, all adhere to the 
dirigiste (state-led) capitalist model.  Private sector economic activity is subsumed under the 
indirect and equally extensive influence of centralised state institutions that direct economic 
activity1 (Bennell, 1997; Hayward, 2008).  This relies on extended state involvement permeating 
through various economic sectors under the direction of the centralized state authority and staffed 
by a cadre of state executives (Hayward, 2008).  Colonial France’s close relationship with its 
former colonies is exhibited with Algeria as well as four cantons of Senegal being considered as 
part of metropolitan France itself (Cumming, 2006).  The extended dirigiste system across much 
 
1 It should be noted that the Dirigiste model was transformative in enabling change in France’s economy although this 
was only achieved using state direction in conjunction with an extensive social security net so when entire state 
supported economic initiatives were drastically changed the population were economically protected before re-
employment in new state-engendered industries (Levy, 2008; Gutelius, 2002).  Such advanced social security does not 
exist in underdeveloped emerging economies inferring that on its own the Dirigiste system is a source of structural 
rigidity 
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of Francophone Africa was staffed by large cadres of French civil servants and executives 
(Hayward, 2008).  Furthermore two Franc-based currency unions2 maintain a fixed peg exchange 
rate with the Euro guaranteed by the French Treasury in Paris (Lavelle, 2001) inferring continued 
influence over the region’s economy, interest rates and terms of trade.  This hegemonic control is 
further exemplified by the relatively recent relocation of both central banks from Paris to Africa in 
1964 (Bennell, 1997).  French civil code law countries in particular have institutional frameworks 
that are closely shaped on centralized bureaucratic state-controlled systems while these have been 
largely staffed by significant cadres of French nationals. 
Rival Portuguese institutional environments, also prevalent in Africa, are also notable in 
their state-led development.  This has an even greater centralized concentration of authority and 
associated bureaucracy (North, 1990).  In contrast common law-based economic systems, have a 
central role of the state as a regulator of markets for production factors, goods and capital rather 
than the subsuming of these under its indirect influence in the case of dirigiste systems (Hayward, 
2008; Levy, 2008; Wright, 2008).  Taken together these institutional factors mediate the 
relationship between IJV boards and their recruitment of social elites.  There is a much greater 
need for the recruitment of social elites in common law systems given their ability to enhance 
information processing power of IJV and attain leverage over dominant regulatory authorities 
where the state exerts a more regulatory influence over markets rather than notions of indirect 
control as in civil code law countries.  The extended influence of state throughout the wider 
economy in civil code law countries infers less of an emphasis on the recruitment of directors that 
can internalize any liability arising owing to the dominance of state control.  Thus the necessity 
and degree to which firms recruit different types of social elites directors is likely to be very 
different between civil code law and common law systems with this simple distinction providing a 
useful institutional mediator.  As such we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
2 The two franc-zones are Union Monétaire et Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UMEAO), including Cote 
d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, and Communauté Économique et 
Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), including Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. 
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Hypothesis 2:  Compared to common law countries, civil code law countries will have a negative 
association between proportion of social elites on board to likelihood of IPO being an IJV 
 
The impact of institutional quality on IJV board composition 
The considerable variation in institutional quality across Africa has been variously attributed to 
differences in legal origin (distinction between civil code and common law) (La Porta et al, 1997, 
1998, 2000, 2008), ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 1997), and a combination of 
mortality and disease environment encountered by early European colonists, as well as the type of 
colonial ambition with this being settler-based, such as South Africa, or resource extractive in 
nature (Acemoglu et al, 2002).  Another explanation has been advanced by Nunn (2007, 2008) 
regarding the long term impact arising from a historical legacy of slavery.  Nunn (2011) argues 
this impacted on levels of trust within African societies both towards other societal members as 
well as towards authority and state institutions.  Nunn and Puga (2012) provides empirical 
evidence regarding the ruggedness of geographic terrain exerting a pervasive influence on 
institutional development.  Thus where geographic ruggedness is found to inhibit institutional 
evolution and economic development elsewhere in world the opposite is true in Africa. 
 More generally Collier and Gunning (1999) argue that Africa has some of the highest 
levels of socio-linguistic diversity in relation to relatively small populations worldwide.  While 
much of this diversity has been attributed to over 400 years of slave trade and associated 
institutions, the onset of European colonialism resulted in modern day national boundaries having 
been drawn in accordance to the limits of colonial expansion rather than taking any account of the 
indigenous population (Davidson, 1992).  As such indigenous political, judicial, and even national 
structures were dissected and subsumed into arbitrary modern states controlled by narrow 
institutional frameworks and colonial authorities.  North Africa fared little better with a dichotomy 
between transplanted French (and Italian in case of Libya) formal institutions being largely 
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incongruous with Islamic shari’ya informal institutions (Hearn, 2011; Hearn, 2014).  
Independence merely inferred the transition of power from imperial to local “colonial” control 
with narrow social elites typically drawn from handfuls of ethnic groups usurping control over 
modern nation states that lack legitimacy in eyes of disparate indigenous populations (North, 1990; 
Joireman, 2001; Lavelle, 2001).  The resulting states adopted a distinctly patriarchal character 
owing to their lacking universal constituency while social elites have been inextricably tied to the 
evolution of institutional environment and thus the quality of institutions.  Social elites are a key 
determinant in indigenous political economies because they are inextricably tied to aggregate 
institutional quality.  This not only underscores their importance in environmental co-optation 
strategies of IJVs but also emphasises the importance of differences in institutional quality 
reflecting differences in the underlying typology of the indigenous political economy.  This is 
itself shaped by social elites and infers co-optation strategies using social elites are contingent on 
shape and structure of political economy and resulting institutional quality. 
 We argue that institutional quality is a mediating factor in the recruitment of social elites 
as part of IJVs environmental co-optation strategy.  The structural contingency perspective adopts 
a more linear perspective in terms of recognizing the importance of social elites as part of IJV 
information processing network in the context of autonomy from parent.  It views improvements 
in institutional quality as inferring a lesser reliance of IJV on autonomy and environmental co-
optation.  Thus this perspective views enhanced institutional quality inferring less of a role of 
social elites on IJV boards in contrast to greater strategic interdependence with parent. 
 While there is a considerable literature regarding public firm linkages with political and 
governmental authorities which largely frames arguments on resource dependency theory (see 
Hillman et al, 1999, 2004; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman and Keim, 1995), there is a much 
smaller literature regarding the dynamic nature of these linkages within the context of institutional 
environment changes.  This is exemplified in Lang and Lockhart (1990) and Lester, Hillman, 
Zardkoohi and Cannella (2008) where the composition of outside directors with other corporate as 
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well as political and governmental linkages was found to evolve in step with institutional change 
reflecting differing resource dependency requirements of the firm in respect of its socially 
embedded environment.  We argue that in the context of underdeveloped emerging economies, 
resource dependency theory is dynamic in its rationalization of the origins of outside directors 
recruited to the board (Pfeffer, 1972) as part of an environmental co-optation strategy of the IJV.  
In particular, very low institutional quality is likely associated with political economy formed 
from essentially patriarchal elites, largely drawn from military or other unelected backgrounds 
(North, 1990), where these have considerable private benefits of control leading to a lack of 
incentives to initiate reforms that would lead to more equitable redistribution of wealth.  In 
contrast, higher institutional quality is likely associated with government and state institutions 
with greater constituency and a more equitable distribution of power and wealth across society.  
This improvement in external contracting environment provides the basis for a more sophisticated 
business environment and thus a greater need for social elites drawn from governmental and 
commercial backgrounds.  Thus institutional quality impacts on structure of political economy, 
distribution and access to resources across a society and hence the changing needs of 
environmental co-optation for the IJV in accordance to resource dependency theory. 
The prescriptions of institutional theory are more complex to interpret.  The IJV is a 
unique hybrid governance structure based on the mutual ownership of two or more partners.  The 
ownership itself, alongside the voting rights it confers, acts as a conduit for the cognitive 
institutions of both the home and host country partners.  The IJV itself sits at an institutional 
interface between the coercive pressures exerted on the entity through each partners share in 
ownership.  This coercive pressure exerted by parents towards the IJV is balanced by normative 
pressures arising from within the host country to conform to industry norms of isomorphic 
legitimacy and thereby signal compliance through recruitment of indigenous social elites.  Given 
the intrinsic relationship between social elites and institutional quality we argue that institutional 
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quality also has a mediating impact on the theoretical tension apparent in institutional theory’s 
view of the IJV board in terms of attending legitimacy.  Thus we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Compared to countries with low institutional quality, those of high institutional 
quality will have a positive association between proportion of social elites on board to likelihood 
of IPO being an IJV 
 
It is worth noting that we used an equally weighted aggregate institutional index formed from the 
six component World Bank Governance measures: corruption control, government effectiveness, 
political stability and absence from violent conflict, regulatory quality, rule of law and democratic 
voice and accountability. 
 
3.  Data and Methods 
3.1  Data 
The dataset construction is in two stages.  First, a list of Initial Primary Offerings (IPOs) on 
African markets between January 2000 and January 2014 was constructed.  In North Africa, these 
include Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, and in SSA Cape Verde Islands (Bolsa de Valores 
de Cabo Verde), Cameroon (Bourse de Douala), BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire), Sierra Leone, Malawi, 
Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Mauritius and Ghana.  Nigeria was also included but on data between January 2002 and January 
2014 were available.  The primary source was the national stock exchanges and their associated 
websites.  These were cross checked with lists sourced from major brokerage houses to ensure 
accuracy in the case of Nigeria and Zambia.  The three listings on the Algerian exchange were 
during the initial period following inception between 1998 and 2000 and have also been included.  
This resulted in 280 listings in total. 
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 Secondly, the IPO prospectuses were obtained.  These are IPO’s or offerings with genuine 
diversification of ownership amongst a base of minority shareholders as opposed to private 
placements involving the preferential allocation of stock with institutional or corporate block 
holders in pre-arranged quantities and prices.  Care was taken to avoid misclassifications with 
registrations, introductions and seasoned (secondary) offerings as these are often also officially 
referred to as IPOs.  Flotations in the two biggest financial markets in Africa, namely South Africa 
and Egypt, are routinely private placements.  These account for the unexpectedly small size of 
IPOs and that in the latter case IPO is commonly undertaken at same time as a private placement.  
This is primarily owing to liquidity concerns in both markets.  Furthermore IPO’s are defined as 
listings of ordinary shares with single class voting rights, that is, excluding preferred stock, 
convertibles, unit and investment trusts as well as readmissions, reorganizations and demergers 
and transfers of listings between main and development boards.  They were collected from the 
financial market regulator websites for Algeria and Morocco while a combination of Thomson 
Corporation Perfect Information and Al Zawya databases were used for Egyptian prospectuses.  
The Al Zawya database, the national stock exchange and direct contact with individual firms, were 
used to source prospectuses for Tunisia.  Similarly in SSA prospectuses were from the Ghanaian, 
Tanzanian, Cape Verdean, and Sierra Leone national stock exchanges and the exchange websites 
in the case of Seychelles and Cameroon.  Thomson Corporation Perfect Information database was 
used in the first instance to source prospectuses from Nigeria, Malawi and Kenya.  Pangea 
Stockbrokers (Zambia) as well as individual floated firms provided prospectuses for the Zambian 
stock market.  Finally, in SSA, the African Financials website (African Financials website, 2012) 
provided information relevant to listing from annual reports.  This resulted in a final sample of 
202 IPOs. 
Considerable care was taken in the interpretation of information from IPO listings 
prospectuses given the considerable variation in size and quality of these filings across the 
continent.  Examples range from inaccuracies in values and units of measurement in Egypt (such 
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as units stipulated in prospectuses as billions where additional verification confirmed value 
denominated in millions) to omissions and inaccuracies in the balance sheets in the prospectuses 
of many smaller Nigerian firms.  Attempts to verify data from prospectuses with additional 
sources such as firm websites, annual reports and mandatory filings of annual accounts were taken 
wherever possible.  US$ Exchanges rates were from Bloomberg. 
 
3.2  Sample 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal that primary IPO markets across the continent are 
primarily formed through the privatization of SOEs with entrepreneurial capital raising being 
largely minimal with the sole exception of the four North African markets.  Further differences 
between North Africa and SSA are exhibited in a proliferation of business group listings in the 
former region while they are more sporadic in the latter – mostly concentrated in Nigeria, regional 
BVRM, Mauritius and Malawi.  Foreign Partner listings, in the form of both IJVs as well as 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, are prevalent in SSA but minimal in North Africa.  It is also notable 
that foreign partners tend to be affiliated with state privatizations underscoring the prevalence of 
partial, or phased, privatizations across the continent (Perotti, 1995; Bennell, 1997).  Foreign 
partners are affiliated to private sector partners to a much lesser extent while there is a small, but 
notable, affiliation with business groups (see Khanna and Rivkin, 2001 for full discussion on 
business group constituents leveraging group-wide reputation to attract FDI) where these are 
mostly family-centred as in the case of North Africa (Hearn, 2014) and centred on the presidency 
in case of Malawi (Hearn and Piesse, 2013). 
Table 1 
 
Further elaboration on the characteristics of IPO listings involving a foreign partner are revealed 
in Table 2.  The ubiquitous nature of IJVs is apparent alongside four “brown field” FDI entities.  
These are the result of an initial IJV where the foreign partner has wholly bought out the host 
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partner and this wholly-owned entity has listed during our sample time frame.  It is notable that 
while foreign partner equity stakes vary across the sample the level of divestment of the IJV 
generally does not.  Where IJV ownership divestment at IPO does take place it is concentrated in 
Morocco and Tunisia as well as Uganda.  Furthermore and despite the variation in foreign partner 
equity stakes these are generally high indicating an elevated level of control over the venture.  
Finally it is notable that the majority of foreign partners originate from Europe with IJVs situated 




3.3  Variables 
Dependent variable 
We use a binary dummy dependent variable taking value 1 if IPO is an IJV, defined in context of 
our sample as having a foreign partner, and 0 otherwise.  This alongside the construction and 
sourcing of data is outlined in Table 3.  Furthermore the direction of anticipated relationships 




We employ five variables to measure the proportion of nonexecutives drawn from social elites to 
board size.  The first is an aggregate social elites measure which is the aggregated total of elites 
drawn from military, governmental, commercial and university backgrounds.  The remaining four 
variables are the proportions of nonexecutives drawn from each of these backgrounds in relation 
to board size.  The designation of nonexecutive directors backgrounds was made in accordance to 
the director profiles in IPO listings prospectuses as outlined in Table 3. 
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 We address the differences in institutional environment (civil code versus common law) 
and institutional quality through the employment of interactive variables.  The first addresses the 
possibility of the effects of pervasive institutional differences between civil code law and common 
law corporations in our sample through employing a civil code law dummy that equals one for 
civil code law and zero otherwise.  To test our interactive legal-family specific hypothesis 2, we 
adopted the methodology suggested by Kim, Hoskisson and Wan (2004) and used subsequently in 
Bruton et al (2010), and used interactions between the civil code law dummy and the ratio of 
aggregate social elites to board size.  The second focuses on hypothesis 3 and adopts a similar 
methodology but instead uses the interactions between ratio of aggregate social elites to board size 
with an aggregate institutional quality measure (see Liu, Lu and Chizema, 2014 for details of 
institutional mediation using an index).  This is formed from the un-weighted average of the six 
World Bank governance indices which is then rebased on a 0 to 10 scale. 
 
Control Variables 
We introduced a number of distinct groups of controls.  The first was institutional and accounted 
for legal origin as well as aggregate institutional quality.  The control for legal origin is the same 
as our civil code law dummy used in our interactive analysis.  Aggregate institutional quality 
captures the quality of the external contracting environment which is itself a reflection of the 
underlying institutional environment and political economy. 
 We employ three board controls: board size, ratio of outsider (independent) nonexecutives 
on board, and ratio of independent (unaffiliated to any stockholder or insider group) foreign 
nonexecutives to board size.  IJV boards are small and typically divided in accordance to the 
equity voting shares of incumbent partners.  These are unlike public companies in emerging 
economies where board size are bigger to reflect the additional information-processing needs from 
recruiting directors with strategic links to market and non-market stakeholders within the 
environment that the firm is socially embedded.  IJVs instead balance strategic interdependence 
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with parents to environmental autonomy and co-optation.  Given the need for accentuated control 
in IJVs (Kumar and Seth, 1998), boards are likely to be smaller.  Following from this argument 
and given the importance of strategic interdependence with parent in terms of control and access 
to resources then there are likely to be fewer outside directors on boards and especially fewer 
unaffiliated independent foreign nonexecutives as the resources these can bring with them can 
instead be preferentially sourced from within the MNE network (Kumar and Seth, 1998; 
Melkumov, 2009; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004).  We anticipate a negative association between all 
board controls and the dependent variable.   
 We applied four firm controls.  These were: size, defined as natural logarithm of firm 
revenues, performance, defined as accounting return on assets (ROA), and age, more precisely the 
natural logarithm of firm age and finally a leverage or financial gearing metric: the ratio of debt to 
total assets, as defined in Table 3.  Size is an important conditioning factor accounting for the 
complexity of operations and task environments facing the board resulting from these.  Given IJV 
boards face complex information processing environments owing to their strategic 
interdependence with parents as well as environmental uncertainty (Kumar and Seth, 1998) we 
would expect a positive relationship between venture size and dependent variable.  In terms of 
performance (ROA) and the TCE theoretical perspective attributes IJV formation to a superior 
alignment of interests and optimal monitoring and performance evaluation (Williamson, 1975, 
1985; Kumar and Seth, 1998).  A positive relationship between performance (ROA) and 
dependent variable is anticipated.  We also controlled for firm age.  Older firms are anticipated to 
have larger, more complex operations mirroring more complex task environments.  Finally the 
ratio of debt to equity captures the differential use of debt as opposed to equity as a governance 
mechanism.  We did not anticipate any direction in associations between age and financial 
leverage with dependent variable. 
 Given anecdotal evidence in Table 2 relating to the dispersion of IJV formation with 
indigenous host partners ranging from state to business groups, the majority of which are centred 
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on families, a range of ownership controls were introduced.  These were based on concentration of 
cash flow ownership rights and take account of the very different motivations and interests of 
different categories of owner (principal).  These were state, corporate block shareholder, aggregate 
board (insider director), and family ownership categories.  A negative relationship between all and 
likelihood IPO firm is an IJV is anticipated. 
 A unique IPO control was used relating to the ratio of shares offered to foreign investors to 
total number of shares issued post-IPO.  This took into account of both the degree of marketing of 
shares to active foreign investors as well as for dispersing ownership at IPO and is anticipated to 
have a negative association with IJVs.  This is derived from the IJV bilateral governance structure 
being very different from that of a conventional firm. 
 Finally I also include industry fixed effect controls.  These were necessitated by the 
findings of Stopford and Wells (1972).  They found that joint ventures were more prevalent in 
certain industries such as extractive and mining, than others.  Furthermore asset specificity and 
low frequency of transactions are key determinants in TCE theoretical arguments behind JV 
formation.  These notably vary considerably across industries necessitating controls. 
 
3.3  Empirical Model 
Estimation was by logistic regression and was undertaken in three distinct stages.  The first 
involves the sequential testing of the three hypotheses (concerning ratio of social elites to board 
size) on top of an array of controls.  The second involves disaggregating the social elites and 
considering their individual sub-components, i.e. those drawn from military, governmental, 
commercial and university backgrounds on top of controls.  The third involves retaining the 
aggregate social elites metric but this time disaggregating the aggregate institutional quality into 
its six constituent World Bank Governance indices.   
 The first set of models, involving formal hypothesis testing, itself involves three steps.  
The first of these simply assesses the impact of the ratio of social elites on board and likelihood of 
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IPO firm being an IJV (the dependent variable).  The second considers the mediating impact of 
legal code (institutional type – i.e. civil code versus common law) on the association between ratio 
of social elites on board and the dependent variable.  The third focuses on the mediating impact of 
institutional quality on the association between retained ownership and the dependent variable. 
 The second set of testing again involves three steps but this time with each of the four 
disaggregated individual social elite constituents (military, government, commercial, university) 
added in together jointly.  These are initially added in altogether, then together using an interactive 
framework mediated by legal origin, and finally using institutional quality as a mediation. 
 The third set of testing involves retaining the generic aggregate social elites variable but 
this time exploring the institutional interactive effects arising from each of the six World Bank 
Governance measures, namely corruption control, government effectiveness, political stability, 
regulatory quality and finally democratic voice and accountability. 
Finally it is notable that differences between countries (institutional environments) are 
accounted for with the legal origin and institutional quality controls.  Additional country are not 
used so as to avoid the dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 2009)3.  However industry and time 
(year) fixed effects are applied across all models. 
 
4.  Data analysis and results 
4.1.  Correlations 
Correlations between all variables are reported in Table 4.  These are all very low and generally 
lacking statistical significance.  It should also be noted at this stage that the correlation between 
legal origin and institutional quality (0.129) is statistically significant but importantly is extremely 
small.  This provides support for assertion of Joireman (2001) that in severely underdeveloped 
countries, the association between legal origin and institutional quality of La Porta et al (1998, 
 
3 If dummy variables for all country categories were included, their sum would equal 1 for all observations, which is 
identical to and hence perfectly correlated with the vector-of-ones variable whose coefficient is the constant term; if 
the vector-of-ones variable were also present, this would result in perfect multicollinearity, so that the matrix 
inversion in the estimation algorithm would be impossible. This is referred to as the dummy variable trap 
(Wooldridge, 2009) 
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4.2.  Empirical results 
The empirical results from hypothesis testing are presented in models 1 to 3 in Table 5.  The 
empirical evidence from all three models supports the maintenance of all three hypotheses.  It 
should also be noted that we ran all models separately with dependent variable omitting the 
“brown field FDI” entities and obtained similar results where these have been omitted for brevity 
although these are available from authors upon request.  Consistent to hypothesis 1 there is a large, 
positive association (+1.527) between ratio of social elites on board and likelihood of IPO firm 
being an IJV (p ≤ 0.10).  Similarly, consistent to hypothesis 2 there is a large, positive association 
between ratio of social elites and dependent variable (+5.149) at (p ≤ 0.05) alongside a very large, 
negative association (-16.159) when this independent variable is mediated by legal origin (civil 
code law dummy) at (p ≤ 0.05).  Finally consistent to hypothesis 3 there is a large, negative 
association between ratio of social elites and dependent variable (-11.701) at (p ≤ 0.05) which 
when mediated by institutional quality leads to a large, positive association (+30.100) between 
resulting interactive variable and dependent at (p ≤ 0.05).  It is also notable that while the 
explanatory power (McFaddon R2) is high for both models 2 and 3 that include interactive effects, 
it is higher for institutional mediation by legal origin i.e. differences between markets-orientated 
(common law) and dirigiste systems (civil code law) systems. 
 In terms of the controls, there is a persistently large, negative association between the 
dependent variable and both the ratio of outsider nonexecutives to board (p ≤ 0.05) and the ratio of 
foreign independent nonexecutives to board (p ≤ 0.01).  There is a large, positive association 
between firm size (log of firm revenues) (p ≤ 0.10) and performance (ROA) (p ≤ 0.10) and the 
dependent variable, while all associations between various ownership categories (corporate block, 
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insider board, state and family) are negatively associated (p ≤ 0.01) and dependent variable.  
Finally there is a large, negative association between ratio of shares offered to active foreign 
investors in relation to total shares issued (p ≤ 0.05) and the dependent variable.  All relationships 
are as anticipated (see preceding Table 3 detailing theoretical relationships). 
 The empirical results arising from the disaggregation of the social elites are shown in 
models 4 to 6.  We have omitted military and university social elite categories owing to the quasi-
separation of parameters inferring models including these variables could not be estimated4,5.  The 
empirical evidence indicates the same associations between both government and commercial 
social elites with the dependent variable which is also extended into the institutional interactive 
associations.  In model 5 civil code law IJV IPOs are likely to have far fewer proportions of their 
boards made up from commercial social elites than their common law counterparts.  A similar 
relationship is apparent in terms of ratio of government social elites in civil code IJV IPOs 
compared to their common law counterparts.  In line with preceding hypothesized associations for 
the aggregate social elites, the evidence in model 6 reveals in countries with high institutional 
quality IJV IPOs are likely to have far higher proportions of their boards made up from 
commercial social elites than their low institutional quality counterparts.  A similar relationship is 
apparent in terms of ratio of government social elites in IJV IPOs in high institutional quality 
countries compared to their low institutional quality counterparts. 
Table 5 
 
The empirical results from the recursive consideration of institutional interactive effects arising 
from each of the six World Bank Governance metrics are outlined in Table 6.  In all six cases, the 
directionality of the association in hypothesis 3 is maintained i.e. that the ratios of both 
 
4 The quasi-separation of parameters for models including ratio of military social elites and ratio of university social 
elites is largely a function of their not being present in the 4 IJV IPOs in Nigeria and Ghana.  Military and university 
social elites are only present in the IPOs of Nigeria and Ghana and are not present elsewhere in African IPOs.  This 
lack of presence in these 4 IJV IPOs causes parameter instability resulting in quasi-separation of parameters 
5 All models were separately estimated on a sample comprised of current sample less Ghana and Nigeria, which are 
the only two countries where military and university elites feature on IPO firm boards.  The results from these 
additional robustness checks substantiate the findings reported here and are omitted for brevity considerations.  These 
are available from authors upon request. 
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governmental and commercial social elites are higher in IJV IPOs in countries with higher 
institutional quality than their counterparts in low institutional quality countries.  While this 
association is maintained for ratio of commercial social elites across the political stability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and democratic voice and accountability institutional dimensions 
(models 9 to 12) the associations in all are barely statistically significant (p ≤ 0.10).  In contrast, 
there are far fewer (only 2) statistically significant associations between ratio of governmental 
social elites and dependent variable that is moderated by corruption control and political stability.  
The relationships with all other controls are as documented for preceding Table 5. 
Table 6 
 
5.  Discussion and conclusions 
5.1  Discussion 
The focus of this study was on elaborating the unique board-level environmental co-optation 
strategies through recruitment of directors drawn from social elites backgrounds in distinctive IJV 
ventures compared to their public company IPO counterparts.  We construct and then employ a 
unique comprehensive sample of IPO firms from across the emerging region of Africa from 
January 2000 to January 2014. 
 Our findings reveal support for the institutionally held view of the centrality of legitimacy 
concerns in the board composition of IJV ventures.  We extend prior studies that have exclusively 
focussed on the trade-off between strategic interdependence with parent and autonomy within the 
environment the IJV is socially embedded.  These typically adopt a focus on the contrasting 
internal versus external roles of the board while we uniquely focus on the environmental co-
optation strategy employed by IJV in terms of board composition with social elites.  Our findings 
substantiate legitimacy as a particularly important issue in terms of IJV boards recruiting social 
elite directors, and especially those from commercial and governmental backgrounds.  These 
findings are pertinent given the proliferation of IJVs that substantiate the listings of emerging 
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stock exchanges which is a function of indigenization and brand awareness, themselves related to 
legitimacy. 
 Our study also reveals the importance of institutions in mediating the anticipated 
relationship between likelihood an IPO firm is an IJV and elevated proportions of board being 
drawn from social elites.  The extensive indirect control exerted over economy in civil code law 
countries through the dirigiste system is in contrast to the centrality of the role of government in 
overseeing the regulation and supervision of production factor, goods and capital markets in 
common law countries.  These differences are reflected in far higher proportions of social elites 
recruited on boards in common law as opposed to civil code IJV IPOs.  Furthermore there is a far 
higher concentration of social elites on IJV boards in environments characterised by high as 
opposed to low institutional quality, reflecting their importance in mitigating environmental 
uncertainties arising from more complex contracting arrangements typical of high quality external 
contracting environments.  In particular we show that IJVs undergoing IPO in environments 
characterised by improved political stability and corruption control at a national level will have 
higher proportions of board comprised of indigenous government directors. 
 
5.2  Limitations 
The principal limitations associated with our study are the exclusive focus on IPOs and the small 
sample size.  The former focus on IPOs acts both as a distinctive contribution in facilitating our 
focus on IJV ventures that have listed for indigenization and legitimacy reasons as well as a 
limitation as a useful extension of this work would be in broadening the sample to include all 
listed entities across the continent.  The smaller sample size associated with our study acts as a 
limitation in terms of creating small sample estimation problems, such as those associated with the 
ratios of military and university social elites whose presence is solely restricted to the IPO markets 
of Nigeria and Ghana where the is a minimal presence of IJVs.  This a broader sample comprised 
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of all listings may alleviate this issue although data availability has been highlighted as a 
significant issue hindering research specific to the African environment. 
 
5.3  Managerial relevance 
Our study makes a unique contribution in the study of IJVs in adopting a broad cross-country 
comparative focus amongst emerging economy IPOs.  This breaks with the limitations inherent in 
literature in focussing either on a singular group, such as developed or developing country IJVs or 
a comparative study of these two categories.  Our employment of institutional context as well as 
institutional quality underscores the mediation role played by institutions in terms of the 
considerable variation in these across emerging economies.  This focus on emerging economies 
sharpens our understanding of the role of social elites in playing a critical role in alleviating 
environmental uncertainty in environments characterised by higher quality institutional quality 
which is a necessary feature in supporting external contracting.  While higher institutional quality 
in political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and democratic voice and accountability 
measures infer a greater need for IJVs to co-opt their environmental uncertainty through 
recruitment of commercial elites, a particularly strong relationship exists between improvements 
in corruption control and political stability and recruitment of government elites to board.  These 
results yield important implications for the structure and composition of IJV boards as compared 
to their public company counterparts within an emerging economy setting.  These results also 
reveal the importance of board composition arising from environmental co-optation that have been 
overlooked in the literature where the little that exists is concerned with mitigation of generic 
environmental uncertainty in IJVs and the degree of indigenous staffing of senior management 
positions. 
 
5.4  Conclusions 
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Using pooled data analysis techniques we examined the proportion of IJV boards staffed with 
indigenous social elites in a comprehensive sample of African IPO firms.  We found a positive 
relationship with higher proportions of social elites on the boards of IJV IPO ventures than their 
public company counterparts.  However this relationship was negatively moderated in civil code 
law environments in contrast to their common law counterparts.  Furthermore this relationship was 
positively moderated in high institutional quality environments compared to their low institutional 
quality counterparts.  This underscores the importance of the role of institutions in environmental 
co-optation strategies involving board composition in IJV ventures and calls for extended studies 
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Table 1. African IPO equity market characteristics for sample period 2000 to 2014 
Table providing descriptive statistics for all IPOs that have taken place across Africa between January 2000 and January 2014.  Binary dummy variables (1/0) indicate the total 
proportion of IPOs per market that are state privatizations, flotations of business group constituent firms, foreign partner affiliated firms (foreign joint ventures), and entrepreneurial 
firms led by founders.  The proportion of state privatization and business group constituent IPO firms that are associated with foreign partners are also documented while the proportion 
of foreign partner associated firms that have no state nor business group affiliation are also provided.  Values reported are country averages formed from across individual firm values.  
All variables are sourced direct from IPO listings prospectuses.  It is also notable that the low number of IPOs in Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa is largely because new listings adopt 
private placement or introductions owing to liquidity concerns.  Legal origin characterizations are based on classifications in La Porta et al (2008) with the sole exception of South 
Africa and Namibia that have mixed Roman-Dutch civil code and English common law systems.  Unaffiliated private sector indicates private sector affiliation outside of any state or 
business group involvement.  N is total number of IPO firms or sample size 
Market N Legal Origin Economic 
Model 
Proportion of Involvement in all IPOs 
State Privatization Business Group Foreign Partner Entrepreneurial 
(CEO-Founder) 
Total Foreign Partner 
Involved 





% % % % % % % 
North Africa           
Algeria 4 French civil code Dirigiste 75.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 
Egypt 10 French civil code Dirigiste 30.00 0.00 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 
Morocco 39 French civil code Dirigiste 5.13 2.56 56.41 5.13 7.69 0.00 35.90 
Tunisia 33 French civil code Dirigiste 6.06 0.00 51.52 3.03 9.09 6.06 51.52 
East Africa           
Kenya 10 Common law Markets- based 40.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 20.00 10.00 20.00 
Mauritius 3 French civil code Dirigiste 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 
Seychelles 1 French civil code Dirigiste 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tanzania 9 Common law Markets- based 77.78 55.56 0.00 0.00 55.56 0.00 11.11 
Rwanda 2 French civil code Dirigiste 100.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Uganda 6 Common law Markets- based 66.67 33.33 0.00 0.00 66.67 33.33 0.00 
West Africa           
Nigeria 26 Common law Markets- based 0.00 0.00 38.46 0.00 7.69 7.69 57.69 
BVRM 7 French civil code Dirigiste 42.86 42.86 57.14 0.00 42.86 0.00 0.00 
Ghana 16 Common law Markets- based 25.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 12.50 12.50 37.50 
Cameroon 2 French civil code Dirigiste 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Cape Verde Is. 4 Portuguese civil code Bank-based 50.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 25.00 0.00 
Sierra Leone 2 Common law Markets- based 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 
Southern Africa           
Botswana 7 Common law Markets- based 14.29 0.00 28.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.57 
Malawi 4 Common law Markets- based 50.00 25.00 50.00 25.00 50.00 25.00 0.00 
Zambia 6 Common law Markets- based 66.67 66.67 0.00 0.00 83.33 16.67 0.00 
Namibia 2 Roman-Dutch/Common Markets- based 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 
Mozambique 2 Portuguese civil code Bank-based 100.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
South Africa 7 Roman-Dutch/Common Markets- based 14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 14.29 14.29 
Total: 202   23.35 11.17 32.49 2.03 19.29 6.60 33.50 
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Table 2. Descriptive characteristics of IPO firm has engaged Long Term Foreign Partners 











North Africa         
Tunisia Société Immobilière Tuniso-
Séoudienne 
Financials JV Business 
Group 
Saudi Arabia Société Tuniso-Séoudienne 
d'investissement et de 
développement 
-2.56 15.96 
 Société Tunisienne des Industries de 
Pneumatiques 
Non-Cyclical Consumer JV Pvt Italy Pirelli SPA -1.58 17.41 
 Société Best Lease Financials JV Pvt Jordan/Saudi 
Arabia 
Al Baraka Bank and Arab leasing 
International Finance 
-18.07 54.22 
         
Morocco Itissalat Al Maghreb/ Maroc Telecom Telecommunication JV State France Vivendi 0.00 35.00 
 Lyonnaise des Eaux de Casablanca Financials JV Business 
Group 
France Groupe Suez -8.00 59.00 
 Groupe Risma Cyclical Consumer JV Business 
Group 
France Groupe ACCOR -8.50 40.50 
         
East Africa         
Kenya Eveready East Africa Industrials BF (Old) Pvt United 
States 
Eveready -19.39 65.01 
 Safaricom Telecommunication JV State UK Vodafone Kenya Ltd 0.00 40.00 
         
Tanzania National Microfinance Bank Financials JV State Netherlands Rabobank Nederland 0.00 34.90 
 Tanzania Breweries Non-Cyclical Consumer JV State South Africa South African Breweries 0.00 50.50 
 Twiga Cement Cyclical Consumer JV State Germany Heidelberg Cement 0.00 69.30 
 Swissport Financials JV State Switzerland Swissport International 0.00 51.00 
 Tanzania Cigarette Co. Basic Materials JV State Japan Japan Tobacco International +24.00* 51.00 
         
Rwanda Brasseries et Limonaderies du 
Rwanda 
Non-Cyclical Consumer JV State Netherlands Heineken NV 0.00 75.00 
         
Uganda National Insurance Corp. Financials JV State Nigeria IGI (through Corporate Holding 
Ltd.) 
0.00 60.00 
 Stanbic Bank Uganda Financials JV State South Africa Stanbic -10.00 90.00 
 Bank of Baroda Financials JV Pvt India Bank of Baroda India -20.00 100.00 
 British American Tobacco Basic Materials BF (Old) State UK British American Tobacco -10.00 80.00 
         
West Africa         
Nigeria Bank Platinum Habib (Bank PHB) Financials JV Pvt Pakistan Habib Bank 0.00 15.30 
 Presco Non-Cyclical Consumer JV Pvt UK Siat Group 0.00 64.69 
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BRVM Abidjan Catering Non-Cyclical Consumer JV State France/ 
Germany 
Groupe Accor; Lufthansa Service 0.00 66.00 
 Office National des 
Télécommunications du Burkina 
Faso 
Telecommunication JV State Morocco Maroc Telecom 0.00 51.00 
 Nouvelles Éditions Ivoiriennes Cyclical Consumer JV State Switzerland Edipresse; Edicef 0.00 43.81 
       0.00  
Ghana Total Ghana Energy BF (Old) Pvt France Total France 0.00 81.39 
 Ecobank Ghana Financials BF (Old) Pvt Togo Ecobank Transnational 
Incorporated 
-5.10 92.20 
         
Cameroon Société Africaine Forestière et 
Agricole du Cameroun 
Extractive JV State France Groupe Bolloré 0.00 68.84 
 Société Camerounaise de Palmeraiess Non-Cyclical Consumer JV State France Société Palmcam -14.65 69.99 
         
Cape Verde Banco Comercial do Atlântico Financials JV State Portugal Grupo CGD/ Banco Interatlântico 0.00 52.50 
 Enacol - Empresa Nac. Combustíveis Energy JV State Angola/ 
Portugal 
Petróleos de Portugal; Socieda de 
Nacional de Combustíveis de 
Angola 
0.00 65.00 
         
Southern Africa         
Malawi Malawi Property Invest. Co. Financials JV State & 
Business 
Group 
South Africa Old Mutual SA 0.00 55.00 
 Real Insurance Co. of Malawi Financials JV Pvt Kenya Real Insurance Co. -35.00 100.00 
         
Zambia Celtel (Zambia) Telecommunication JV Pvt Kuwait Zain Kuwait -20.00 88.89 
 BP Zambia Energy JV State UK British Petroleum (BP) 0.00 75.00 
 AEL Zambia Energy JV State South Africa AEL Group 0.00 80.00 
 Zambia National Commercial Bank Financials JV State Netherlands Rabobank Nederland 0.00 49.00 
 Pamodzi Hotels Cyclical Consumer JV State India Taj Hotels 0.00 70.00 
         
Mozambique Cervejas de Moçambique Non-Cyclical Consumer JV State South Africa South African Breweries 0.00 65.00 
         
South Africa Royal Bafokeng Platinum Extractive JV State South Africa AngloPlat -17.80 30.45 
Notes: (1) * indicates an increase in ownership stake 
 (2) BF/ JV indicate brown field and joint-venture FDI investment respectively.  It is worth noting that the small number of BF originally started as JV’s prior to full acquisition. 
 (3) A special case exists in South Africa where the Royal Bafokeng nation is a semi-autonomous indigenous African nation state within South Africa.  Given this unique 
 status we assign AngloPlat as a long term foreign partner within South Africa (in context of Bafokeng nation).  The state entity acting as host partner is the holding company 
of the Royal Bafokeng nation. 
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Table 3.  Definitions of variables 
This table outlines the construction and sourcing of dependent variable and all control variables used in this study 
Variable Definition Predicted 
sign 
Dependent Variable (DV)   
Likelihood of IPO firm being an 
IJV 
The likelihood of IPO firm being an international joint venture (IJV) 
entity is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if IPO firm is an IJV and 
0 otherwise 
 
   
Independent Variables   
Ratio Social Elites This is the number of nonexecutives drawn from all social elite 
backgrounds (military, government, commercial and university) in 
relation to board size 
(+) 
Ratio Social Elites Military This is the number of nonexecutives with senior military (positions of 
admiral, general, brigadier, group captain and above in army, air force, 
navy) backgrounds in relation to board size 
(+) 
Ratio Social Elites Government This is the number of nonexecutives with senior governmental 
backgrounds in relation to board size.  Government backgrounds include 
senior civil service appointments, roles of former president, prime 
minister, diplomatic and ambassadorial roles 
(+) 
Ratio Social Elites Commercial This is the number of nonexecutives with senior commercial 
backgrounds in relation to board size.  Commercial backgrounds are 
defined as prestigious blue-chip directorships, commercial attaché roles, 
board level roles in national chambers of commerce. 
(+) 
Ratio Social Elites University This is the number of nonexecutives with senior academic and university 
backgrounds in relation to board size.  University backgrounds are 
defined as professor and above. 
(+) 
   
Interactive variables   
Ratio Social Elites x Civil Code 
Law 
This is the ratio of social elites multiplied by civil code law binary 
dummy 
(-) 
Ratio Social Elites Government 
x Civil Code Law 
This is the ratio of social elites drawn from government backgrounds 
multiplied by civil code law binary dummy 
(-) 
Ratio Social Elites Commercial 
x Civil Code Law 
This is the ratio of social elites drawn from commercial backgrounds 
multiplied by civil code law binary dummy 
(-) 
   
Ratio Social Elites x 
Institutional Quality 
This is the ratio of social elites multiplied by aggregate institutional 
quality 
(+) 
Ratio Social Elites Government 
x Institutional Quality 
This is the ratio of social elites drawn from government backgrounds 
multiplied by aggregate institutional quality 
(+) 
Ratio Social Elites Commercial 
x Institutional Quality 
This is the ratio of social elites drawn from commercial backgrounds 
multiplied by aggregate institutional quality 
(+) 
   
Institutional Environment   
Institutional Quality We use the six well established World Bank Governance institutional 
quality indices disseminated by World Bank.  These have first been 
rescaled to dimensions of 0 to 10 to facilitate comparability.  The six 
measures are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.  The construction and definition 
of each of the six indicators is outlined in detail on World Bank 
Governance website (World Bank Governance indicators, 2012).  
Indicators compiled from Kaufmann et al. (2009) "Governance Matters 
VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008". World Bank Policy 
Research June 2009. These are downloadable from 
http://www.govindicators.org.   
(-) 
Control of Corruption Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests 
(-) 
Government Effectiveness Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 




Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism 
(-) 
Regulatory Quality Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development 
(-) 
Rule of Law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence 
(-) 
Voice and Accountability Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
(-) 
   
Board Controls   
Board Size This is defined as total number of executive and nonexecutive directors 
in unitary split board systems, or number of nonexecutive directors plus 
members of executive management committee in supervisory two-tier 
board systems. 
(-) 
Outsider Nonexecutive Ratio This is defined as the number of independent outside nonexecutive 
directors in relation to board size. 
(-) 
Ratio foreign independent 
nonexecutives 
This is the number of foreign nonexecutives that are independent to any 
insider group in relation to board size. 
(+) 
   
Legal Controls   
Civil Code Law (Legal Origin) This is a binary dummy adopting value 1 if country is civil code law and 
0 if it is common law as characterised in La Porta et al (2008) 
(+) 
   
Firm Controls   
Log (Revenue) This is defined as natural logarithm of gross sales revenues in pre-IPO 
year (estimated in US$) as obtained from IPO prospectus. 
(+) 
ROA We include a firm performance-based measure as a control with this 
being defined as accounting return on assets.  This is formed from 
US$ converted net income in pre-IPO year to US$ converted total asset 
value in same year which are sourced from IPO prospectus. 
(+) 
Log (Firm Age) This is the natural logarithm of firm age, in years from its inception to 
IPO 
(+) 
Debt to Total Asset Ratio This is the total value of liabilities to total asset value of IPO firm.  Both 
are sourced from IPO listings prospectus and translated into US$. 
(+) 
   
Ownership controls   
State Own Percentage ownership in pre-IPO year attributed to state entities (-) 
Corporate Block Own Percentage ownership in pre-IPO year attributed to foreign partner (-) 
Aggregate Board Own Percentage ownership in pre-IPO year attributed to board members (-) 
Family Own Percentage ownership in pre-IPO year attributed to family entities (-) 
   
IPO controls   
Ratio Offer Size to Foreign 
Investors to Total Shares Issued 
This measure relates the total number of shares offered (available) to 
Foreign Investors in the IPO to the total number of shares issued and 
outstanding of the overall firm post-IPO. 
(-) 
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Table 4. Correlations 
Table presenting Pearson correlations between all variables.  These are the likelihood of foreign partner associated with IPO firm defined as 1 if firm is joint venture with 
foreign partner and 0 otherwise.  Aggregate Ratio of Social elites is reported, being defined as proportion of nonexecutives drawn from social elite backgrounds to board size.  
Aggregate institutional quality is the aggregated measure from equally weighted combination of six individual World Bank governance indicators, defined in Table 2 above, 
that have been rescaled on a 0-1 scale.  All other variables are as defined in preceding Table 2.  The natural logarithm of firm revenues and firm age are used. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Likelihood of IPO firm being an IJV 1.000        
2 Ratio Social Elites 0.150** 1.000       
3 Legal Origin -0.120** -0.477†† 1.000      
4 Institutional Quality -0.063 -0.155†† 0.129** 1.000     
5 Board Size -0.027 -0.200†† 0.284†† -0.087 1.000    
6 Outsider Nonexecutive Ratio 0.069 0.283†† -0.242†† 0.183†† -0.224†† 1.000   
7 Ratio Foreign Independent Nonexecutives -0.132** -0.044 -0.144** 0.166† -0.003 0.007 1.000  
8 Log (Firm Revenues) 0.091* 0.071 0.019 -0.005 0.235†† 0.114* 0.031 1.000 
9 ROA 0.138** 0.096* -0.065 0.093 -0.107* 0.103* -0.043 0.033 
10 Log (Firm Age) 0.097* -0.036 0.071 -0.097* 0.136** -0.050 0.053 0.233†† 
11 Debt-to-Total Asset Ratio 0.146** 0.069 -0.073 0.063 -0.038 0.059 -0.029 0.009 
12 Corp Block Own -0.080 -0.034 -0.095* 0.210†† -0.091 0.220†† 0.110* 0.034 
13 Insider Board Own -0.289†† 0.027 -0.183†† 0.006 -0.215†† 0.107* 0.148** -0.155** 
14 State Own 0.108** 0.294†† 0.032 -0.034 0.153** -0.126** -0.066 0.169† 
15 Family Own -0.318†† -0.325†† 0.415†† 0.016 0.044 -0.209†† -0.055 0.020 
16 Shares Offered to Foreign Investors / Total Shares -0.145† 0.127** -0.327†† 0.008 -0.079 0.121** 0.045 -0.164† 




Table 4. Correlations continued 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Likelihood of IPO firm being an IJV         
2 Ratio Social Elites         
3 Legal Origin         
4 Institutional Quality         
5 Board Size         
6 Outsider Nonexecutive Ratio         
7 Ratio Foreign Independent Nonexecutives         
8 Log (Firm Revenues)         
9 ROA 1.000        
10 Log (Firm Age) -0.038 1.000       
11 Debt-to-Total Asset Ratio 0.898†† -0.014 1.000      
12 Corp Block Own -0.039 -0.016 -0.028 1.000     
13 Insider Board Own 0.011 -0.261†† -0.052 -0.125** 1.000    
14 State Own -0.063 0.162** -0.047 -0.152** -0.373†† 1.000   
15 Family Own 0.008 0.058 -0.040 -0.247†† 0.014 -0.382†† 1.000  
16 Shares Offered to Foreign Investors / Total Shares 0.024 -0.156** 0.027 0.018 0.158** -0.045 -0.178†† 1.000 




Table 5. Institutional factors determining whether IPO firm is an International Joint Venture (IJV) 
 Likelihood of IPO firm being an IJV 
 Aggregate Social Elites  Disaggregated Social Elites (commercial/ government) 
 Controls Legal system Institutions  Controls Legal system Institutions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -5.598 [-1.13] -12.196 [-1.91]** -3.985 [-0.68]  -4.674 [-1.04] -10.318 [-1.21] -3.014 [-0.43] 
Independent variables        
H1:  Ratio Social Elites 1.527 [1.30]* 5.149 [1.70]** -11.701 [-1.76]**  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
H2:  Ratio Social Elites x Civil Code Law -- -- -16.159 [-1.68]** -- --  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
H3:  Ratio Social Elites x Institutional Quality -- -- -- -- 30.100 [2.08]**  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 Ratio Elites Commercial -- -- -- -- -- --  3.839 [0.76] 10.817 [1.30]* -26.191 [-0.94] 
 Ratio Elites Commercial x Civil Code Law -- -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -52.925 [-1.68]** -- -- 
 Ratio Elites Commercial x Institutional Quality -- -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- 64.243 [1.30]* 
 Ratio Elites Government -- -- -- -- -- --  0.339 [0.22] 2.462 [0.72] -15.098 [-2.03]** 
 Ratio Elites Government x Civil Code Law -- -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -12.449 [-1.32]* -- -- 
 Ratio Elites Government x Institutional Quality -- -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- 35.227 [2.20]** 
Institutional variables        
Civil Code Law (Legal Origin) -0.598 [-0.39] 1.945 [1.45]* -0.841 [-0.46]  -0.712 [-0.43] 1.305 [0.46] -1.033 [-0.52] 
Aggregate Institutional Quality 9.682 [1.03] 12.444 [0.99] 5.768 [0.57]  8.474 [0.88] 11.056 [0.93] 4.440 [0.44] 
Board Controls        
Board Size -0.117 [-0.82] 0.016 [0.10] -0.081 [-0.53]  -0.119 [-0.86] 0.038 [0.22] -0.087 [-0.64] 
Outsider Nonexecutive Ratio -3.357 [-1.76]* -4.857 [-1.51]* -4.462 [-2.24]**  -2.864 [-1.54]* -3.365 [-0.91] -4.357 [-2.36] † 
Ratio Foreign Independent Nonexecutives -23.795 [-3.38] †† -22.615 [-3.61] †† -25.442 [-3.35] ††  -23.782 [-3.56] †† -22.974 [-2.99] †† -27.480 [-3.62] †† 
Firm Controls        
Log (Firm Revenues) 1.372 [0.99] 2.167 [2.09]** 1.394 [0.86]  1.300 [0.95] 1.808 [1.73]** 1.388 [0.71] 
ROA 4.293 [1.39]* 7.138 [2.17]** 5.105 [1.58]*  5.264 [1.53]* 8.380 [2.38] † 5.294 [1.68]** 
Log (Firm Age) 0.039 [0.05] 0.492 [0.62] 0.163 [0.17]  -0.068 [-0.08] 0.061 [0.05] 0.064 [0.06] 
Debt to Total Asset Ratio 0.296 [0.60] 0.512 [0.89] 0.269 [0.56]  0.182 [0.35] 0.606 [0.96] 0.328 [0.69] 
Ownership Controls        
Corp Block Own -0.167 [-3.49] †† -0.199 [-3.29] †† -0.182 [-3.12] ††  -0.164 [-3.77] †† -0.205 [-3.18] †† -0.187 [-3.22] †† 
Insider Board Own -0.145 [-2.84] †† -0.186 [-2.91] †† -0.140 [-2.91] ††  -0.149 [-2.62] †† -0.183 [-3.12] †† -0.146 [-2.71] †† 
State Own -0.113 [-3.23] †† -0.145 [-4.24] †† -0.119 [-2.77] ††  -0.109 [-3.20] †† -0.130 [-3.68] †† -0.120 [-2.46] † 
Family Own -0.172 [-3.53] †† -0.211 [-4.49] †† -0.179 [-3.03] ††  -0.170 [-3.67] †† -0.208 [-3.54] †† -0.186 [-2.85] †† 
IPO Controls        
Shares Offered to Foreign Investors / Total Shares -3.305 [-1.85]** -3.050 [-1.29]* -3.471 [-1.68]**  -3.498 [-1.99]** -3.211 [-1.29]* -3.675 [-1.68]** 
        
No Obs. = 0 161 161 161  161 161 161 
No Obs. = 1 36 36 36  36 36 36 
No. Obs. 197 197 197  197 197 197 
LR statistic (prob.) 133.59 [0.00] 138.42 [0.00] 135.23 [0.00]  133.45 [0.00] 138.45 [0.00] 136.21 [0.00] 
McFadden R2 0.7131 0.7388 0.7218  0.7123 0.7389 0.7270 
Notes: (1) Industry and time (year) fixed effects included in all models; (2) Z-statistics are in parentheses; (3) QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance; 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; †p<0.01; ††p<0.005 
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Table 6. Institutional factors determining whether IPO firm is an International Joint Venture (IJV) 





Political Stability Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of Law Voice & 
Accountability 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Intercept 0.584 [0.10] -0.880 [-0.24] -1.806 [-0.22] 0.659 [0.14] -1.788 [-0.30] -5.435 [-0.71] 
Interactive variables       
Ratio Social Elites Commercial -2.726 [-0.14] -2.170 [-0.12] -34.816 [-1.30]* -29.738 [-1.30]* -26.074 [-1.28]* -25.073 [-1.29]* 
Ratio Social Elites Commercial x Institutional Dimension 19.529 [0.36] 16.621 [0.39] 52.601 [1.28]* 70.234 [1.30]* 62.590 [1.29]* 61.267 [1.55]* 
Ratio Social Elites Government -8.223 [-1.47]* 3.744 [0.36] -18.061 [-2.40] † -1.257 [-0.13] -8.250 [-0.96] -13.979 [-0.90] 
Ratio Social Elites Government x Institutional Dimension 28.008 [1.68]** -9.936 [-0.39] 34.072 [2.35] † 1.989 [0.11] 18.117 [1.03] 30.500 [0.91] 
Institutional Quality Dimensions       
Dimension:  Corruption Control 3.638 [0.40] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Dimension:  Effective Government -- -- -1.065 [-0.10] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Dimension:  Political Stability -- -- -- -- 3.172 [0.80] -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Dimension:  Regulatory Quality -- -- -- -- -- -- -5.171 [-0.49] -- -- -- -- 
Dimension:  Rule of Law -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4.207 [0.67] -- -- 
Dimension:  Voice & Accountability -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.706 [0.72] 
Civil Code Law (Legal Origin) -1.761 [-1.28]* 0.001 [0.01] -2.289 [-1.52]* 0.023 [0.02] -1.306 [-1.30]* 0.403 [0.24] 
Board Controls       
Board Size -0.110 [-0.77] -0.104 [-0.97] 0.005 [0.03] -0.107 [-1.03] -0.121 [-1.01] -0.006 [-0.04] 
Outsider Nonexecutive Ratio -4.158 [-2.53] † -1.697 [-1.28]* -4.484 [-2.24]** -1.945 [-1.46]* -2.875 [-1.93]** -4.428 [-1.57]* 
Ratio Foreign Independent Nonexecutives -26.801 [-3.46] †† -20.390 [-2.33] † -35.102 [-2.49] † -20.312 [-2.51] † -26.375 [-2.91] †† -24.529 [-2.97] †† 
Firm Controls       
Log (Firm Revenues) 1.036 [0.61] 1.272 [0.80] 1.388 [0.71] 1.378 [0.76] 1.264 [0.77] 1.568 [0.87] 
ROA 5.786 [1.54]* 6.034 [1.42]* 7.140 [1.52]* 5.524 [1.49]* 4.037 [1.29]* 6.600 [2.10]** 
Log (Firm Age) 0.048 [0.05] -0.075 [-0.10] -0.719 [-0.85] 0.127 [0.15] -0.079 [-0.09] 0.100 [0.12] 
Debt to Total Asset Ratio 0.095 [0.21] -0.09 [-0.19] 0.213 [0.33] -0.019 [-0.04] 0.344 [0.54] 0.220 [0.54] 
Ownership Controls       
Corp Block Own -0.172 [-3.14] †† -0.129 [-3.23] †† -0.208 [-2.04]** -0.131 [-2.78] †† -0.165 [-2.46] † -0.189 [-2.89] †† 
Insider Board Own -0.160 [-2.75] †† -0.170 [-1.94]** -0.172 [-2.43] † -0.171 [-2.06]** -0.150 [-2.84] †† -0.154 [-2.90] †† 
State Own -0.114 [-2.57] †† -0.103 [-2.60] †† -0.141 [-1.93]** -0.104 [-2.32] † -0.115 [-2.38] † -0.116 [-3.09] †† 
Family Own -0.175 [-2.99] †† -0.154 [-2.79] †† -0.214 [-2.04]** -0.157 [-2.49] † -0.179 [-2.65] †† -0.187 [-2.96] †† 
IPO Controls       
Shares Offered to Foreign Investors / Total Shares -4.233 [-2.42] † -2.824 [-1.80]** -4.609 [-2.49] † -2.797 [-1.93]** -3.618 [-2.23]** -3.332 [-1.30]* 
       
No Obs. = 0 160 160 160 160 160 160 
No Obs. = 1 36 36 36 36 36 36 
No. Obs. 196 196 196 196 196 196 
LR statistic (prob.) 134.90 [0.00] 132.09 [0.00] 141.09 [0.00] 133.28 [0.00] 135.02 [0.00] 136.03 [0.00] 
McFadden R2 0.7200 0.7051 0.7531 0.7114 0.7206 0.7260 
Notes: (1) Industry and time (year) fixed effects included in all models; (2) Z-statistics are in parentheses; (3) QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance; 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; †p<0.01; ††p<0.005 
